BCT Editorial – 12/8/06

This page was last updated on December 9, 2006.

Role model; Editorial; Beaver County Times; December 8, 2006. Though this editorial appeared in the print edition of the Times, it did not appear on the Times website.

In summary, the lengthy editorial lauded “the way in which the 10-member panel reached its recommendations.” Indeed, the editorial opined the process was “equally important” to the actual recommendations of the Iraq Surrender Group (ISG). Most of the input allegedly came from an interview by liberal op-ed writer David Broder (The Washington Post) of one Republican and two liberals on the ISG. The editorial also found some space to take a shot at Karl Rove.

What didn’t the editorial mention?

· You’ll find no discussion of how the ISG members were chosen.

· You’ll find no discussion of the qualifications of the ISG members and their relevance for this task.

· You’ll find no discussion of the quality of the ISG report.

· You’ll find no assessment of the ISG recommendations.

Apparently, as long as the ISG members were collegial, the actual output of the group is of secondary importance. Maybe it’s just me, but when the overriding requirement for a team is that there be an equal number of Democrats and Republicans (or any other group), that tells me the effort is for show.

What were the ISG recommendations? While you can read the report yourself, here are several examples.

· “Recommendation 16: In exchange for these actions and in the context of a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis should return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee for Israel that could include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if requested by both parties.”

· “Recommendation 17 (1^st bullet item): Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to the principle of land for peace, which are the only bases for achieving peace.”

· “Recommendation 19: The President and the leadership of his national security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership.”

· “Recommendation 23: The President should restate that the United States does not seek to control Iraq’s oil.”

As a reminder, Israel seized the Golan Heights from Syria during the 1967 war for strategic reasons. You see, the Golan Heights are much higher than adjacent Israel and provided Israel’s enemies with an ideal position from which to shell Israel settlements until the Heights were captured in 1967.

Regarding “a U.S. security guarantee for Israel that could include an international force on the border,” is the ISG kidding? Lest we forget, the UN had “an international force on the border” of Lebanon and Israel yet this force routinely ignored – and in some cases helped – Hezbollah when it was operating right under their noses. In the June 2006 conflict, Hezbollah even used the UN outposts as cover from which to fire rockets into Israel.

Regarding “including U.S. troops if requested by both parties,” I have two problems. First, I don’t want U.S. troops involved, period. Second, even if I was OK with U.S. troops guarding the Israel/Syria border, the “if requested by both parties” phrase guarantees it would never happen. In what alternative universe would Syria ever ask for help to keep terrorists from attacking Israel?

Regarding “the principle of land for peace” being one of “the only bases for achieving peace,” that’s BS. Since 2000, Israel has returned chunks of land to the Palestinians only to have attacks on Israel continue essentially unabated.

In fairness, while some of the 79 recommendations are not as inane as these, are “recommendations” like these what we should expect from “our best and brightest?”

Finally, while the report used the word “victory” three times in its 84 pages, it did so only in reference to victory by al-Qaida.

· “Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand its base of operations.” – Executive Summary, page six

· “Al Qaeda will portray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant victory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and around the world.” – Assessment, page 28

· “Al Qaeda would depict our withdrawal as a historic victory.” – Assessment, page 30

In conclusion, I’d be inclined to call the ISG report a joke if the stakes weren’t so serious.